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STATEMENT REGARDING JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78-2a-3(2)(j) (case transferred from the Supreme Court).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I. Whether the district court's finding that plaintiff was a partner in Access Auto
with defendant Ali Ghaffarian is clearly erroneous? (Issue preserved in the Record, R1291 at 338:11-342:17).
Standard of Review: "With respect to mixed questions of law and fact, we will
review the underlying facts under the deferential clear error standard; however, the legal
effect of those facts is within the province of the appellate court, and 'no deference' need
be given a lower court's resolution of such questions of law." McKay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d
941, 944 (Utah 1998.)
II. Did the district court err in failing to address or agree with defendants'
argument that plaintiffs claims are barred by the four year statute of limitations, Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-25? (Issue preserved in the Record, R-1292 at 508:12-510:10).
Standard of Review: The applicability of a statute of limitations is a question
of law which is reviewed for correctness. Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d 742, 753 (Utah 2002).
III. Did the district court err in awarding rental value and prejudgment interest as
damages under Utah Code Ann. § 48-4-39? (Issue preserved in the Record at R-l 113,
1115-17).

1

Standard of Review: Challenge of conclusion of law underlying trial court's
order is not accorded any deference, but is reviewed for correctness. Berube v. Fashion
Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989).
PERTINENT STATUTES
Resolution of this case necessarily involves application of the following Utah Code
provisions:
48-1-39. Rights of retiring or estate of deceased partner when the
business is continued.
When any partner retires or dies and the business is continued under
any of the conditions set forth in Section 48-1-38(1), (2), (3), (5), (6), or
Section 48-l-35(2)(b) without any settlement of accounts as between
him or his estate and the person or partnership continuing the business,
unless otherwise agreed, he or his legal representatives as against such
persons or partnership may have the value of his interest at the date of
dissolution ascertained, and shall receive as an ordinary creditor an
amount equal to the value of his interest in the dissolved partnership
with interest, or, at his option or at the option of his legal
representatives, in lieu of interest, the profits attributable to the use of
his right in the property of the dissolved partnership; provided, that the
creditors of the dissolved partnership as against the separate creditors or
the representatives of the retired or deceased partner shall have priority
on any claim arising under this section, as provided by Section 48-138(8).
78-12-25. Within four years.
An action may be brought within four years:
(1) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon
an instrument in writing....
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the Final Amended Judgment entered by the district court
following a two-day bench trial on the issue of whether plaintiff/appellee Hassan
Mardanlou ("Mardanlou") entered into an oral partnership agreement with
defendants/appellants (the "Ghaffarians") to operate a used car business under the name
"Access Auto." (R-1221-24). This case was first tried in part before Judge Henriod on
July 13, 2000. After the first day of trial, the parties entered into a settlement in open
court, upon which judgment was entered on August 15, 2000. (R-1288 at pp. 196-98).
The Ghaffarians filed a Motion to Set Aside Settlement on August 14, 2000. (R-l 82-87).
Judge Henriod recused himself and an evidentiary hearing on that motion was held before
Judge Dever on March 20, 2001. (R-1289). Judge Dever granted the motion and entered
an order setting aside the judgment on April 13, 2001, finding that defendants' settlement
"was not the product of a knowing, voluntary and intelligent conclusion." (R-383).
The case was then tried before Judge Dever on October 15, 16, and 17, 2002. (R1290-92). On October 18, 2002, Judge Dever announced his findings and conclusions
from the bench. (R-1292 at pp. 517-19). Judge Dever found that (1) the inclusion of both
Access Auto and Mardanlou's business, M&M Motors, on a property lease agreement
and an insurance document supported the inference of a partnership; (2) Mr. Ghaffarian
referred to Mr. Mardanlou as his "partner"; (3) Mr. Mardanlou ordered business cards for
Access Auto containing both his and Mr. Ghaffarian's first names on the card; (4) Mr.
3

Mardanlou worked at the car lot while Mr. Ghaffarian purchased the vehicles; and (5) Mr.
Mardanlou wrote checks on the M&M Motors account to pay for furniture and other
expenses benefitting Access Auto. (Id.)
Based on these findings, Judge Dever ruled that Mr. Mardanlou was a partner in
Access Auto with Mr. Ghaffarian, that Mr. Ghaffarian had appropriated partnership
property by purchasing the property that was the subject of the lease agreement (the
"Property") solely in his own name, and ordered the Ghaffarians to deed one-half of the
Property to Mardanlou, subject to further hearing to apportion the debt incurred in
connection with the Property. (R-931-36).
An evidentiary hearing was held by the district court on April 3, 2003, pursuant to
defendants' Motion for Limited New Trial. (R-1293 at pp. 15-111). On July 22, 2003,
the district court issued Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a
Memorandum Decision and Order (R-1078), after which the defendants filed a Motion to
Amend and Objections on August 13, 2003 (R-l 110), which Motion the district court
granted in part and denied in part by its Order dated April 20, 2004 (R-l 197).
The district court entered its final Amended Judgment on September 17, 2004, in
which it ordered the defendants to transfer by deed to plaintiff an undivided one-half
interest in the real property "known as Access Auto." (R-1221-23). The interest to be
transferred to plaintiff Mardanlou is "subject to an equitable lien in favor of Defendants,
reflecting the obligation of Plaintiff to pay Defendants one-half the $663,414.90 amount
4

that Defendant advanced towards the Property" after November 7, 1997 through June 14,
2004, for mortgage payments, insurance, property taxes, improvements and interest. (Id.)
The court also found that the Ghaffarians' interest in the Property was subject to an
equitable lien in favor of Mr. Mardanlou, in the amount of one half the Court-determined
$83,500 annual rental value from November 7, 1997 until the date of judgment, plus
interest. The court dismissed all remaining claims with prejudice. (Id.)
The Ghaffarians filed their Notice of Appeal on October 13, 2004. (R-1225).
Mardanlou filed a Notice of Cross Appeal on October 25, 2004. (R-1246).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants Ali Ghaffarian and his spouse, Nasrin Faezi Ghaffarian formed Access
Auto in July 1989. (R-1291 at pp. 247:21-23). The bond required to operate an
automobile dealership in Utah was issued in the name of Nasrin Ghaffarian. Ali
Ghaffarian obtained the required licenses to purchase and sell cars for Access Auto, and
Ali and Nasrin Ghaffarian opened a joint bank account for Access Auto with First
Security Bank at that time (R-1291 at p. 250:6-12).
Appellee Hassan Mardanlou formed M&M Janitorial Service in 1986, which he
operated with his brother until he allegedly formed M&M Motors in 1989. (R-1290 at pp.
26:29-29:6).l Through M&M Motors, Mardanlou testified that he was a "wholesaler"
1

The Utah State Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division reported that "Mr.
Mardanlou is not, nor has he ever been, licensed as a Motor Vehicle Dealer in the State of
Utah during the years 1998 to date." (Defendants' Trial Exh. 13). Nor was the Division
5

who purchased vehicles from auto auctions, "fixed them up" and then sold the vehicles to
a dealer or another auto auction. (R-1290 at p. 29:10-15).
Mardanlou testified that during a trip to California to purchase vehicles at auction,
he and Ghaffarian discussed the possibility of "getting together" in the auto business. (R1290 at p. 31:5-16). When a car lot location became available at 3960 State Street, the
parties discussed the possibility of sharing the rent and other expenses to operate their
separate businesses from that location. (R-1290 at p. 32:1-14; R-1291 at p. 444:23-25).
Mr. Mardanlou contends that the parties originally intended that he leave M&M Motors
"to become a partner with Ali as Access Auto." (R-1291 at p. 38:14-16). The
Ghaffarians recall the arrangement differently. Nasrin Ghaffarian testified that "Access
Auto was going to operate as Access Auto and M&M Motors was operating as M&M
Motors . . . Hassan was going to sell his cars and Ali was going to sell Access Auto cars."
(R-1291 at pp. 423:19-424:1). Mr. Ghaffarian testified that the purpose of his
arrangement with Mr. Mardanlou was to share certain costs, including rent and insurance,
while operating as "two different dealerships." (R-1291 at p. 453:19-20). "Both
companies would sell cars from the State Street location, I helped him, he helped me. I
sold his cars; he sold my cars and we helped each other." (R-1291 at pp. 275:14-276:12).

able to locate any record of a license for M&M Motors. (Id.) Although Mr. Mardanlou
produced copies of documents that he contends support his claim that he was licensed, he
never produced a Utah dealer certificate. (R-1291 at pp. 467:9-468:10; 470:8-12).
6

On November 5, 1991, "M&M Motors, Inc. and Access Auto, Inc." executed a
lease agreement with Cline Dahle Investments to rent the property at 3960-3964 South
State Street in Salt Lake County (the "Property"). (Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 1). Mr.
Ghaffarian paid the $6,000 for the first and last month's rent required when the lease was
signed. (R-1290 at p. 35:16-19).2 Mr. Mardanlou paid $2,000 for furniture and
equipment. (R-1290 at p. 35:17-19). The Lease Agreement was for a one-year term, with
an option to renew the lease for one additional year, and an option to purchase the
Property at the end of the lease term for $365,000. Both men signed the lease on behalf
of their respective companies on November 15, 1991. (Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 1).
In addition to planning on sharing the costs of the Property, Mr. Ghaffarian
contacted his insurance agent to ask whether there was "a way to combine [their separate
policies] so that the two men could purchase a single policy that" would "cover both"
companies. (R-1290 at pp. 197:1-199:14). When asked at trial whether the parties
"represented that they were partners in this business", the insurance agent testified that he
did not hear "either one of them say that we are partners". (Id.) The agent confirmed that
he was instructed to obtain coverage for both Access Auto and M&M Motors because
Mr. Mardanlou "wanted to make sure" to "maintain M&M Motors on the policy." (R1290 at pp. 200:8-201:9). The agent testified that when he talked to "Farmers, they would
2

The district court incorrectly held in its oral findings after the trial on October
18, 2002, that "[tjhere was payment by the plaintiff for the first and last months' rent at
the time of the signing of the lease." (R-1292 at p. 518: 5-7). Plaintiff conceded this
error (R-878), and it was omitted from the written Findings. (R-931).
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not allow us to do it with - where it would state Access Auto and M&M Motors and so
the only way we could do that, issue that policy," was to "list both individuals and list it
asaDBL." (R-1290atpp. 199:15-201:9). The agent confirmed that as of December 18,
1991, Mr. Mardanlou insisted on maintaining insurance coverage for M&M Motors. (R1290 at pp. 205:19-207:13). (Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 4).
Although the parties shared the same location and provided services on behalf of
each other's business, they maintained separate bank accounts and accounting. Access
Auto maintained a checking account (0540030137) at First Security Bank (R-1291 at p.
434:1-7). Mr. Mardanlou was not an authorized signator on the Access Auto account, nor
did he ever have access to the bank account statements. (R-129 at pp. 107:18-108:11; R1291 at p. 435:7-15). Mr. Mardanlou maintained account no. 2721148014 in the name of
M&M Motors at First Security Bank until "the end of 1992." (R-1290 at p. 43:11-13).
Those account statements indicated he had a balance of $2,683.10 in November 1991 and
$45.94 in December 1991. (Defendant's Trial Exh. 5).
Mr. Mardanlou testified that he focused his efforts on "running the car lot" while
Ali was "in charge of buying the vehicles." (R-1290 at p. 38:2-21). Mr. Mardanlou
claims that he wrote checks on the M&M Motors account in the amount of $31,000 to pay
for "parts and labor" to repair vehicles sold by both Access Auto and M&M Motors. (R1290 at pp. 41:19-43:5; Plaintiffs Exhibit 2). He later admitted under cross-examination,
however, that he received checks from Access Auto payable to "M&M Motors" that
8

exceeded the amount he paid toward repairs on Mr. Ghaffarian's cars. (R-1290 at pp.
87:2-88:16, 153:11-156:18; Defendants'Trial Exh. 1). The payments from Access Auto
to M&M Motors were more than sufficient to reimburse plaintiff for the $2,000 furniture
he allegedly purchased (R-1290 at p. 35:19-22) and to pay for the employee salaries he
claims to have paid. (R-1290 at pp. 153:12-156:18).
Mr. Mardanlou purchased cars for M&M Motors "up until the end of 1992." (R1290 at p. 82:6-14). Because M&M Motors only sold vehicles wholesale, it's cars were
sold to retail customers through Access Auto. Upon the sale of an M&M Motors vehicle,
Mr. Ghaffarian would pay M&M Motors with an Access Auto check. (R-1290 at pp.
99:17-102:15).
Although M&M Motors and Access Auto continued to operate as separate
businesses with separate bank accounts through 1992, it soon became apparent that Mr.
Mardanlou's auto business was almost non-existent. (R-1291 at pp. 451:7-454:6). He
had no money to pay for rent, utilities, or to buy cars. (Id.) The " 15 to 20 cars" that he
told Mr. Ghaffarian were coming from Idaho never materialized. (R-1291 at pp. 453:14454:6). Mr. Mardanlou reluctantly admitted under cross examination that the Ghaffarians
were contributing "the vast part of the money" to purchase cars. (R-1290 at pp. 79:3-4;
83:6-9).
Mr. Mardanlou contended at trial that his failure to contribute any money towards
the rent or the purchase of cars is explained by the fact that he contributed his time
9

"getting everything done at Access Auto while Ali [was] in charge of buying the
vehicles". (R-1290 at p. 87:5-12). He was forced to admit, however, that he received a
$10,000 payment by Mr. Ghaffarian in March of 1993 to compensate him for his
assistance on Access Auto matters. (R-1290 atpp. 87:12-88:19; 48:7-9). The
Mardanlous reported that payment on their 1993 tax return as an "employee wage bonus
rather than some sort of profit sharing." (R-1291 atpp. 235:17-236:1; 96:24-98:3). Mr.
Mardanlou went on the Access Auto payroll in April 1993 (R-1290 at pp. 90:3-14; 139:411) and continued to receive two payroll checks each month until he left Access Auto in
November of 1997. (Id.) He claims that Mr. Ghaffarian's accountant told him that he
could be paid as an employee and still be a partner. (R-1290 at p. 117:18-25). The
accountant testified that he has no recollection of such a conversation. (R-1291 at p.
382:13-19).
Mr. Mardanlou's spouse has been employed by the IRS for 25 years and under IRS
employee rules knew she was obligated to "file timely and correct tax returns." (R-1291
at p. 230:11-23). The Mardanlous5 filed a joint personal tax return for the year ending
December 31, 1992, in which they listed "M&M Motors" as a sole proprietorship with
gross receipts of $45,458. (Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 6). Mr. Mardanlou also took the benefit
of over $42,000 in losses for M&M Motors on his personal tax returns for 1991 and 1992,
a valuable tax advantage that was not used to reduce the tax liability of Access Auto, the
company in which he claims to have become a partner in 1991. (R-1291 at pp. 233:21-
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234:7). The Mardanlous never once reflected a partnership "share or return for Access
Auto" on their tax returns for the years 1992 through 1997, the period during which Mr.
Mardanlou claims he was a partner in Access Auto. (R-1291 at pp. 237:24-238:5;
Plaintiffs Exh. 6).
Mr. Mardanlou "explains" his failure to correctly report partnership income on his
personal tax returns for the years 1991 through 1997, by claiming that he was waiting for
Mr. Ghaffarian to "do the taxes partnership with me." (R-1290 at p. 117:12-25). Mr.
Mardanlou claims that he approached Mr. Ghaffarian in April 1992 "about filing a
partnership return." (R-1290 at pp. 113:16-117:25). Mr. Ghaffarian allegedly told him
that he had to do his "own taxes first, then we can get together and do our partnership."
(R-1290 at pp. 114:25-115:2). Mardanlou claims that although Ghaffarian refused to "do
partnership taxes" with him in 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996, he just kept filing tax
returns as an employee of Access Auto and assumed that he would one day work out his
"partnership taxes" with Mr. Ghaffarian. (R-1290 at p. 118:4-17). The Ghaffarians' joint
1991 federal tax returns were prepared on August 12, 1992 (Defendants' Trial Exh. 22)
and their 1992 returns were timely filed in April 1993. (Defendants' Trial Exh. 23; R1291 at p. 282:9-12). Those tax returns report Access Auto as a "sole proprietorship"
with Ali Ghaffarian listed as the "proprietor". (Defendants' Trial Exh. 22-22).
Mr. Mardanlou has no recollection of participating in the negotiations to renew the
lease after the term of the original lease that he signed expired in November 1992. (R11

1290 at 108:11-25). Mardanlou alleges that "Ali, without the permission or knowledge of
Hassan, by himself, exercised the option contained in the lease" in November 1993. (R132; Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 7). At first, Mr Mardanlou admitted that he became "aware
that Ali had exercised the option . . . approximately 6 months later" in May 1994. (R132). He later testified that he did not discover that fact until "late 1994, early 1995." R1290 at p. 64:2-5).
During the six years that Mr. Mardanlou claims he was a "partner" in Access Auto,
he never once "participated in deciding what Ali's payroll or take from the company was"
(R-1290 at p. 142:20-24), and he admitted that Mr. Ghaffarian unilaterally determined his
"draw" from the business without Mr. Mardanlou's "involvement." (R-1290 at pp.
142:20-143:3). He had no access to the Access Auto check ledger, bank account
statements, or mail box. (R-1290 at pp. 107:18-108:10). Not a single supplier or other
business associate of Access Auto appeared at trial to testify that they heard Mr.
Mardanlou refer to himself as a partner or owner of Access Auto. (R-1290 at pp. 102:20103:12). Mr. Mardanlou never paid any money towards rent of the Property nor for any
of its subsequent mortgage payments, nor did he pay for any of the Property taxes or
insurance. (R-1293 at pp. 38:24 to 39:2).
On a W-4 form submitted to the IRS, Mr. Mardanlou swore under penalty of
perjury that he was an "employee" of Access Auto. (Defendants' Exhibit 11; R-1290 at
pp. 162:3-163:12). He also signed a credit service subscriber agreement as the "manager"
12

of Access Auto with Mr. Ghaffarian signing as the "subscriber" or owner. (Defendants5
Trial Exh. 14; R-1290 at pp. 170:1-171:20). When submitting a loan application to First
Security Bank, Mr. Mardaniou listed himself as the "manager" of Access Auto and
designated "Ali" (Mr. Ghaffarian) as his "supervisor". (Defendants' Trial Exh. 17; R1290 at pp. 176:4-178*2). A mechanic employed by Access Auto testified that during his
three years with the company, whenever someone came into the business asking to see the
"owner", Mr. Mardaniou would "either send them to Ali or tell them Ali wasn't there."
(R-1291 at pp. 346:24-347:12). Similarly, the windshield supplier for Access Auto
testified that Mr. Mardaniou would never purchase a replacement windshield without first
obtaining approval from Mr. Ghaffarian. (R-1291 at pp. 405:12-406:9).
Mr. Mardaniou testified that he decided to leave Access Auto in 1997 when Mr.
Ghaffarian again refused his request to file partnership tax returns. (R-1290 at pp.
111:15-112:20). On November 6, 1998, one year after he quit working for Access Auto,
Mardaniou filed his Complaint in this action against Ghaffarian, Ghaffarian's spouse,
Nasrin Faezi-Ghaffarian, and Access Auto, alleging that he was not an employee of
Access Auto but that he was Mr. Ghaffarian's partner, and asserted claims for breach of
partnership, fraud, and misrepresentation. (R-l). The defendants denied that Mardaniou
was ever a partner with the Ghaffarians or Access Auto. (R-22).
The case was tried before the Honorable L.A. Dever of the Third District Court,
without a jury, on October 16-18, 2002. (R-1290-92). On October 18, 2002, Judge Dever
13

announced his findings and conclusions from the bench. (R-129 at pp. 517-19).
Thereafter, on November 7 and 27, 2002, defendants filed Objections and Motions under
Rules 50 and 52 challenging the court's rulings, and on January 9, 2003, filed a Rule 59
Motion for Limited New Trial. (R-643, 654). Written Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, and a non-final Judgment was entered by the district court on February 4, 2003.
(R-931, 936). The Final Amended Judgment was entered on September 17, 2004. ® at
1221).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A business relationship does not qualify as a "partnership" under Utah law unless
the parties agree to share in the profits and control of the enterprise. Bassett v. Baker,
530 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 1974). Even if the parties believe they have a partnership or use the
words "partnership" or "joint venture" in their discussions or agreements, a partnership
will not be found "if the elements" of profit sharing and mutual control "are missing".
Betenson v. Call Auto, 645 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah 1982). Here, Ali Ghaffarian and Hassan
Mardanlou agreed to enter into a cost sharing arrangement and to provide certain services
to each other's company that were reimbursed to their respective bank accounts. While
Mr. Mardanlou.and his friend testified that Mr. Ghaffarian referred to this relationship as
a "partnership", the facts are undisputed that Mr. Ghaffarian never shared the profits of
Access Auto with Mr. Mardanlou.

14

After it became apparent that Mr. Mardanlou's business (M&M Motors) was
failing, Mr. Mardanlou became an employee of Access Auto and started receiving payroll
checks in April 1993. For nearly five years, from April 1993 through November 1997,
Mardanlou worked as an employee of Access Auto. He was paid a salary that he reported
as wages on his tax returns; he never asked for any partnership draws or profits; he made
no objection while the Ghaffarians drew funds from the business without his input or
involvement; he represented himself as an "employee" of Access Auto on bank loan
applications, tax forms and to suppliers; he took no action for more than five years after
Mr. Ghaffarian refused his alleged requests for a partnership reconciliation so that his
wife (who worked for the IRS) could file tax returns that accurately reflected Mr.
Mardanlou's alleged partnership interest; and he was not a signatory on the Access Auto
bank account and never had access to the bank account statements or the Access Auto
mail box. Based on these admitted facts, the district court's finding that Mr. Mardanlou
was a "partner" in Access Auto is both clearly erroneous and incorrect under the dual
standard of review for mixed questions of law and fact. See, Bassett v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1
(Utah 1974) (reversing trial court's finding of a joint venture where the business
arrangement did not involve a sharing of profits or the "mutual right to control"); McKay
v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941, 944 (Utah 1988) (district court's findings of underlying facts
reviewed for clear error; application of facts to law are afforded no deference but are
reviewed for correctness).
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The district court also erred by refusing to consider the defendants' statute of
limitations defense. Mr. Mardanlou testified that beginning in April of 1992, he asked
Mr. Ghaffarian for a partnership reconciliation so that Mr. Mardanlou's wife could file
tax returns reflecting Mr. Mardanlou's alleged partnership interest in Access Auto. Mr.
Ghaffarian refused that request and all subsequent requests made by Mr. Mardanlou from
1992 to 1997. As an IRS employee, Mrs. Mardanlou understood the serious
consequences of Mr. Ghaffarian's alleged refusal to produce the partnership information
that her husband required in order to file accurate tax returns in 1992 through 1997. Yet
the Mardanlous did not file this claim until November 1998, more than six years after Mr.
Ghaffarian allegedly refused to provide them with that information.
While this delay in filing strongly suggests that Mr. Mardanlou did not believe he
was a partner in Access Auto until discussing the matter with an attorney in 1998, it is not
necessary to reach the merits of his oral partnership claim in order to conclude that his
cause of action accrued more than four years before he filed that claim in November
1998. The four-year statute of limitations for breach of an oral agreement "begins to run
upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action". See,
Russell Packard Development v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, ^f 20 (2005)(internal quotations
omitted). That occurred when Mr. Ghaffarian allegedly refused Mr. Mardanlou's
repeated requests for a partnership reconciliation and treated Mr. Ghaffarian as a salaried
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employee, not an equal owner. Having acquiesced in that conduct for more than seven
years, Mr. Mardanlou's claim for breach of an oral partnership agreement is time-barred.
Finally, the district court erred in awarding damages based on the post dissolution
rental value of the property. When a partner leaves the partnership and the business is
continued, Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-39 provides for the recovery of the value of the
departing partner's "interest in the dissolved partnership" plus "interest" on that amount.
"In lieu of interest", the departing partner may elect "the profits attributable to the use of
his right in the property".
Mr. Mardanlou is not entitled to interest because the court never "ascertained . . .
[the] amount equal to the value of his interest." (Id.) Instead of awarding monetary
damages "equal to the value" of Mr. Mardanlou's interest in Access Auto, the district
court ordered the Ghaffarians to "transfer by deed" to Mr. Mardanlou a one-half interest
in the Property. Monetary interest is not available where no "amount" is ascertained upon
which the interest can be calculated.
Similarly, Mr. Mardanlou is not entitled to "profits attributable to the use of his
right in the property of the dissolved partnership" because he offered no evidence of the
post dissolution profits "attributable" to the use of that property. The district court erred
by awarding damages based on the alleged rental value of the property.
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ARGUMENT
I.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT
PLAINTIFF WAS A PARTNER IN ACCESS AUTO AUTO
Two different standards of review apply to the district court's ruling that Mr.
Mardanlou was a partner with Mr. Ghaffarian in Access Auto. "With respect to mixed
questions of law and fact, we will review the underlying facts under the deferential clear
error standard; however, the legal effect of those facts is within the province of the
appellate court, and 'no deference' need be given a lower court's resolution of such
questions of law." McKay v. Hardy. 973 P.2d 941, 944 (Utah 1998).
While the burden on a party challenging factual findings under the clearly
erroneous standard is a heavy one, that burden is satisfied here because the undisputed
facts establish that the relationship between Mr. Mardanlou and Mr. Ghaffarian did not
satisfy the elements of a partnership or joint venture. The district court's finding of a
legal partnership should also be reversed under the "correctness" standard of review
because the "legal effect" of the underlying facts found by the district court is at most an
agreement to share costs, not an agreement to share profits and control - required
elements in establishing a partnership under Utah law.
The elements of a joint venture or partnership under Utah law include the
following:
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The parties must combine their property, money, effects, skill, labor and
knowledge. As a general rule, there must be a community of interest in
the performance of the common purpose, a joint proprietary interest in
the subject matter, a mutual right to control, a right to share in the
profits, and unless there is an agreement to the contrary, a duty to share
in any losses which may be sustained.
Bassett v. Baker. 530 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 1974) (emphasis added).
The parties' characterization of their relationship as a "joint venture" or
"partnership" is not determinative. Rogers v. Bitner, 738 P.2d 1029, 1032 (Utah 1987).
Even if the parties believe they have a partnership or use the words "partnership" or "joint
venture" in their discussions or agreements, a partnership will not be found "if the
elements . . . are missing." Betenson v. Call Auto, 645 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah 1982). Here,
two "essential elements" for establishing a partnership or joint venture are lacking: there
is no evidence that Mr. Mardanlou had (1) the right to share profits in Access Auto, or (2)
the mutual right to control that company.
A.

MARSHALING OF EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF DISTRICT COURT'S
FINDING THAT MARDANLOU AND GHAFFARIAN WERE PARTNERS IN
ACCESS AUTO
Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states that "[a] party

challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the
challenged finding." Marshaling entails "listing all the evidence supporting the finding
that is challenged" and then demonstrating that the "marshaled evidence is legally
insufficient to support the findings when viewing the evidence and inferences in a light
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most favorable to the decision." Judge Norman H. Jackson, Utah Standards of Appellate
Review: Revised, 12 Utah J. 8, 13 (1999). The evidence supporting the district court's
finding of a partnership is listed below. Sections B and C explain why the district court's
factual findings are clearly erroneous. Sections D and E analyze why the district court
erred as a matter of law in concluding that the "legal effect of those facts" is to create a
partnership.
Mr. Ghaffarian and Mr. Mardanlou executed a lease agreement on behalf of their
respective companies on November 5, 1991. (Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 1; R-1290 at p. 33:2311). The lease was executed in the name of "M & M Motors, Inc. and Access Auto, Inc. .
. . as lessee." (Id.) Mr. Mardanlou testified that after the lease was signed, Mr. Ghaffarian
shook his hand and said "we are in this together, partner." (R-1290 at p. 55:7-11).
Mr. Mardanlou paid $2,000 for furniture and equipment that remained at Access
Auto when he terminated his relationship with that company in 1997. (R-1290 at p.
35:19-25). He also wrote two checks from M & M Motors in early 1992 to pay the wages
of an Access Auto employee and possibly a few others at that time. (R-1290 at pp.
134:14-137:17 Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 14). Mr. Mardanlou brought a total of five cars with
him when he started working with Mr. Ghaffarian at the 3960 South State Street location.
(R-1290 at pp. 39:24-40:6). The proceeds from the sale of those cars were deposited into
the M & M Motors account that he claimed paid for repairs on vehicles sold by both M &
M Motors and Access Auto. (R-1290 at pp. 42:2-43:20; Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 2 and 3).
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The parties also asked Mr. Ghaffarian's agent about obtaining an insurance policy
in the names of "Ali Ghaffarian & Hassan Mardanlou Access Auto DBA: M & M
Motors". (Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 4; R-1290 at pp. 40:10-41:6). The insurance agent
testified that he "formed the assumption" that Ali and Sam were partners. (R-1290 at pp.
40:7-41:13). Business cards were purchased with the name "Access Auto" on the top and
"Ali" and "Sam" underneath. (Plaintiffs Trial Exh.5; R-1290 at pp. 36:14-37:22).
Mr. Mardanlou testified that when he first learned Mr. Ghaffarian exercised the
lease option to purchase the car lot, Mr. Ghaffarian told him not to worry, "we are still
partners, there's nothing going to happen between us." (R-1290 at pp. 64:2-65:8). Mr.
Mardanlou testified that Mr. Ghaffarian allegedly explained that he purchased the lot in
his own name because he did not want the transaction to "interfere" with Mr.
Mardanlou's efforts to obtain a home mortgage. (R-1290 at p. 64:14-21). Mr.
Mardanlou's witness, Hashem Farr, a mutual "friend" of Mr. Mardanlou and Mr.
Ghaffarian, testified that he was present when Mr. Mardanlou raised this issue and heard
Mr. Ghaffarian say "don't worry about that. . . we're partners." (R-1291 at pp. 322:24323:14). Mr. Farr testified that both men told him "they had combined the business
together and they were going into real business together as partners." (R-1291 at p.
320:3-10). Another friend of Mr. Mardanlou testified that Mr. Mardanlou told him that
he was going to join Mr. Ghaffarian in a "partnership". (R-1290 at p. 217:1-5).
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Mr. Mardanlou ran the car lot while Mr. Ghaffarian purchased vehicles at auction.
(R-1290 at pp. 38:10-39:23). Mr. Mardanlou sold the cars from the lot and handled the
financing paperwork. Id. Mr. Mardanlou received $10,000 from Mr. Ghaffarian in
March of 1993 that he believed was his share in profits from the business. (R-1290 at p.
48:5-20). Based on this evidence, the district court found that Mr. Mardanlou and Mr.
Ghaffarian were partners in Access Auto.
B.

THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES THAT THE
PARTIES DID NOT INTEND TO SHARE THE PROFITS OF ACCESS AUTO.
"Profits" are defined as "the excess of returns over expenditures in a transaction or

series of transactions." Penelko, Inc. v. John Price Assoc, 642 P.2d 1229, 1234 (Utah
1982). Where there is no direct testimony in the record of an agreement to share profits
such an agreement may be inferred from the "actions taken by the parties." See, Rogers v.
Bitner, 738 P.2d at 1032 ("a joint venture does not always arise pursuant to a formal
agreement; rather it is a relationship voluntarily entered by the parties and all may be
proven by the actions taken by the parties."). The parties' "actions" in this case prove that
there was never an agreement or understanding between the parties to share profits in
Access Auto.
Plaintiff admitted that during the six years he claimed to be a partner, Mr.
Ghaffarian and his wife decided what their "draw" from Access Auto would be without
any input from the plaintiff. (R-1290 at pp. 142:2-143:2). Plaintiff simply accepted the
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salary determined by Mr. Ghaffarian and never requested an accounting or even an
explanation of how the supposed "profits" were being used. The $10,000 payment that
plaintiff received in 1993 (which he now characterizes as a "profit" distribution) was in
fact listed as an employee salary bonus on his tax return. (R-1290 at 97:2-98:3; Plaintiffs
Trial Exh. 6). In fact, Mr. Mardanlou never once reflected a partnership "share or return
for Access Auto" on his individual tax returns for the years 1992 through 1997. (R-1291
at pp. 237:19-238:1; Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 6). The actions of the parties prove that there
was no agreement to share profits.
Nor is there any evidence in the record of an express agreement to share profits.
Mr. Mardanlou testified that Mr. Ghaffarian shook his hand and said, "We are in this
together, Partner." (R-1290 at 55:7-11). But the mere use of the term "joint venture" or
"partnership" to describe a business relationship is not sufficient to sustain a legal finding
of partnership where there is no evidence of an agreement to share profits. See, cases
cited infra at Section I.E. Similarly, the witness who testified on plaintiffs behalf that he
heard Mr. Ghaffarian refer to plaintiff as his "partner" (R-1291 at pp. 322:24-323:17)
later conceded that he never heard the parties discuss "how they were going to share or
divide up profits." (R-1291 at p. 328:5-16). The lease agreement and insurance policy
(Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 1 and 4) cited by the district court as evidence of a partnership are
also silent on the issue of profit sharing.
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The Utah Supreme Court has consistently reversed findings of "partnership" or
"joint venture" where the profit sharing element is not satisfied. See, e.g., Vern Shutte &
Sons v. J.R. Broadbent 24 Utah 2d 415, 473 P.2d 885 (Utah 1970) (reversing trial court's
finding of a joint venture because the evidence did not establish that "the parties
manifested by their conduct a desire to commingle their profits, control and risks in
achieving the objective"); Bassett v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1 (Utah 1974) (reversing trial
court's finding of a joint venture because there was no evidence that the parties intended
"to share losses as well as profits."); Betenson v. Call Auto Equipment Sales, 645 P.2d
684 (Utah 1982) (reversing trial court's finding of a joint venture despite parties' use of
that phrase in their agreement because "the elements of a joint venture" were not
established). Here, the parties course of conduct over a six-year period establishes that
the parties did not agree to share the profits of Access Auto.
C.

THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES THAT THE
PARTIES DID NOT INTEND TO SHARE CONTROL OF ACCESS AUTO.
Plaintiff consistently represented himself as an employee or manager of Access

Auto. (102:20-103:12). He represented to the IRS and to a federally insured financial
institution that AH Ghaffarian was his "supervisor" or "employer". (R-1290 at pp. 162:3163:12; 176:4-178:2; Defendants' Trial Exh. 11, 14 and 17). When customers or
suppliers entered Access Auto and asked to see the owner, plaintiff referred them to Mr.
Ghaffarian. (R-1291 at pp. 346:24-347:12). Plaintiffs own conduct over a six-year
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period refutes his contention that he shared the right to "mutual control" over Access
Auto with Mr. Ghaffarian.
Plaintiff also conceded that he had no access to the Access Auto check ledgers and
bank account statements nor was he even permitted access to the company mail box. (R1290 at pp. 107:18-108:10). He did not participate in the renewal of the property lease
nor did he have any involvement in the preparation or filing of Access Auto's tax returns.
(R-1290 at p. 152:20-22). Most importantly, he admitted that he never participated in
"deciding what Ali's payroll or take from the company was". (R-1290 at pp. 142:20143:3). These admissions out of Mr. Mardanlou's own mouth demonstrate that an
essential element in proving the existence of a partnership is lacking in this case. There is
no evidence of an agreement granting Mr. Mardanlou a "mutual right to control" Access
Auto. The district court's finding of "partnership or joint venture" is clearly erroneous.
D.

THE LEGAL EFFECT OF THE UNDERLYING FACTS FOUND BY THE
DISTRICT COURT ESTABLISHES AT MOST AN AGREEMENT TO SHARE
COSTS. NOT AN AGREEMENT TO SHARE PROFITS AND LOSSES.
The evidence relied upon by the district court supports Mr. Ghaffarian's testimony

that the parties originally intended to share certain costs while operating M&M Motors
and Access Auto as separate businesses. (R-1291 at p. 451:16-20). The legal effect of
that evidence does not establish an agreement to operate a single partnership business
under the name of Access Auto. Had that been the original intent, there would have been
no need for the parties to execute the lease in the name of both Access Auto and M&M
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Motors. (Plaintiff s Trial Exh. 1). Nor would the parties have instructed their insurance
agent to "maintain M&M Motors on the policy." (R-1290 at p. 201:2-9). The inclusion
of M&M Motors on the lease and the insurance policy proves that the parties intended to
continue the operation of both entities, after they joined together to share costs in
November 1991.
The parties' agreement to "divide the labor" is also consistent with an arrangement
between Access Auto and M&M Motors to operate as separate companies while sharing
certain costs. Mr. Mardanlou testified that he was to "run" the car lot while "Ali is going
to be in charge of buying the vehicles." (R-1290 at p. 38:6-39:3). Mardanlou admitted,
however, that M&M Motors received a $10,000 check from the Access Auto account in
March 1993, after which he went on the Access Auto payroll in April 1993. (R-1290 at
pp. 87:12-88; 48:7-9; 90:3-14; 139:4-11). The fact that Mr. Mardanlou was paid for the
services he provided to Access Auto proves that the arrangement was one of cost sharing-not partnership profit-sharing.
Mardanlou also admitted that through 1992 (one year after he allegedly became a
partner in Access Auto in November 1991) he continued to purchase cars in the name of
M&M Motors. (R-1290 at p. 82:6-14). When those cars were sold through Access Auto,
Mardanlou received checks from Access Auto which he deposited into the M&M Motors
account. (R-1290 at 99:7-102:15). Again, the undisputed evidence that Mr. Ghaffarian
was reimbursed for his vehicle sales is consistent with an agreement to share costs, not
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profits. Moreover, Access Auto issued numerous other checks to M&M Motors in 1992
that were more than sufficient to reimburse Mardanlou5s costs for the $2,000 in furniture
and for the employee salaries he claims to have paid. (Defendant's Trial Exh. 1; R-1290
at pp. 35, 87-88, 153-156).
The district court also based its finding of a partnership on testimony that "Ali
Ghaffarian represented to his friend, Hashem Farr, that plaintiff and he were partners."
(R-1290 at p. 217:1-5; R-1291 at pp. 320:3-10; 322:25-17). Significantly, Mr. Fanadmitted under cross-examination that he never heard plaintiff or Mr. Ghaffarian discuss
"how they were going to share or divide profits." (R-1291 at p. 328:5-16). His testimony
that he overheard statements by Mr. Ghaffarian that the parties intended to "combine their
business together" as "partners" establishes at most an arrangement to share costs. Such
an arrangement does not establish an agreement to share profits and control - essential
elements of a partnership that are missing here. As the Utah Supreme Court has stated,
"the characterizations given by the parties are certainly not determinative of the issue" of
whether a partnership exists. Rogers v. M.O. Bitnen 738 P.2d 1029, 1032 (Utah 1987).
The testimony of Hasem Farr is not sufficient to establish the existence of a partnership in
the face of undisputed evidence that there was no agreement or intent for Mr. Mardanlou
to share in the profits or control of Access Auto. The evidence relied upon by the district
court does not, as a matter of law, support the conclusion that Mardanlou was a partner in
Access Auto.
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Nor does the creation of a business card including the names of "Sam" and "Ali"
reflect an intent by the parties to create a partnership to share profits in Access Auto.
(Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 5). Mardanlou testified that M&M Motors was in the "wholesale"
business (R-1290 at p. 29:5-15) so he sold his cars through Access Auto. (R-1290 at p.
41:19-22). However, all money received from the sale of M&M Motors' cars was
deposited into the M&M Motors account. (R-1290 at pp. 41:19-42:4). That conduct is
consistent with Mr. Ghaffarian's testimony that he and Mr. Mardanlou intended to
operate their companies as separate businesses from a single location with separate
accounting to reimburse each other for expenditures made or services provided. Had the
parties intended for Mardanlou to leave M&M Motors "to become a partner with Ali as
Access Auto", there would have been no need to deposit proceeds from the sale of M&M
Motors' vehicles into the M&M account. The conduct of the parties in (1) maintaining
separate bank accounts, (2) entering into a lease in the name of both companies, (3)
reimbursing each other for expenditures made and services provided on each other's
behalf proves that they did not intend to become partners in Access Auto.
E.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING OF PARTNERSHIP IS CONTRARY TO
UTAH SUPREME COURT DECISIONS APPLYING PARTNERSHIP LAW TO
AUTO DEALER RELATIONSHIPS.
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that the use of the term "partner" or

the sharing of facilities, advertising or other joint efforts by persons engaged in the auto
sales business is not sufficient to support the legal conclusion of a partnership where there
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is no evidence of mutual control or the sharing of profits. In Bates v. Simpson, 121 Utah
165, 239 P.2d 749 (1952), the Court held that where two auto dealers Mid business from
the same used car lot," referred to each other as "partner", and advertised "used cars" on a
large sign containing both of their names, the dealers were not engaged in a joint venture
or partnership because there was "no agreement, express or implied, for the sharing of
profits." 239 P.2d at 752. Similar to this case, each dealer in Bates "had his own cars to
sell, and when one of them sold a car belonging to the other, the one whose car was sold
paid to the one who sold it a flat fee of $25, in contrast to sharing the profits." 239 P.2d
at 751. The dealers also made money on each other's car sales in the form of financing
charges. Id. Despite this mutually beneficial "working arrangement", the Utah Supreme
Court held:
To establish a joint adventure there must be an agreement, express or
implied, for the sharing of profits. The relationship in this case is not
one of joint adventure by virtue of the fact that [one partner] realized a
profit in the form of a [financing charge on the sale of the other
vehicles]. Profits gained by Simpson from the sale of the car and
reserves earned by Saunders for financing the transaction are two
different things. Sharing the lot, the building and the telephone does not
constitute this working relationship between the two dealers a joint
adventure.
239P.2dat752.
To the extent that Mardanlou and Ghaffarian sold vehicles for each other or
provided other services, those sales and efforts were reimbursed. (87:2-88:16; 153:11156:17). As in Bates, the sharing of some costs and the appearance of both their names
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on an advertising sign or card does not create a joint venture or partnership where there is
no evidence of profit sharing. See also, Betenson v. Call Auto and Equipment Sales, 645
P.2d 684, 686 (Utah 1982) (reversing finding of a joint venture between an auto dealer
and investors despite their "use of the words joint venture in a contract" because the
elements of "a mutual right of control [and] a right to share in the profits" were not
established).
The Utah Supreme Court also rejected an oral partnership claim in Harmon v.
Greenwood, 596 P.2d 636 (Utah 1979) where an auto dealer and one of his employees
executed a letter of intent to "enter into formal agreements to effect" a partnership on
specified terms. Although a formal agreement was never executed, the employee claimed
that "the parties had an actual partnership in fact" based on (1) oral discussions; (2) the
dealer's introduction of the employee "to others as his partner"; (3) a newspaper
advertisement stating that the employee was "going to be made a partner"; (4) placement
of the employee's name on the dealership's "draw account"; and (5) evidence that the
employer allowed the employee to "hire and fire some employees". (596 P.2d at 637-38).
As in this case, the employee also alleged that "he repeatedly requested Greenwood to
consummate the paperwork to the partnership", but that Greenwood procrastinated,
stating there was "no hurry". (Id.)
In affirming the district court's finding that no partnership was created, the Utah
Supreme Court stated that the evidence of an agreement offered by the employee "is
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woefully lacking in the requisite specificity required for judicial enforcement. . . where
there was simply some nebulous notion in the air that a contract might be entered in the
future, the court cannot fabricate the kind of contract the parties ought have made and
enforce it." 596 P.2d at 639. The Court also held that the employer's alleged agreement
to "consummate the paperwork to the partnership" sometime in the future was not
sufficient to support a finding of partnership where the employee "never received any
profits from the . . . business, as would a partner." (Id.)
Here, Mardanlou "never received any profits" from Access Auto. He was paid as
an employee each year, a fact that he reported on his tax returns in 1992 through 1996.
Mr. Mardanlou's testimony that Mr. Ghaffarian deferred his requests to "do partnership
taxes" is at most evidence of "some nebulous notion that a contract might be entered in
the future." As in Harmon, that evidence is "woefully lacking in the requisite specificity
required for judicial enforcement" of a partnership. The district court's finding that Mr.
Mardanlou was a partner in Access Auto is contradicted by the undisputed fact that he
"never received any profits" from that business. The judgment awarding Mr. Mardanlou
a one-half interest in the Access Auto property should be reversed with directions to enter
judgment in favor of the Ghaffarians.
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II.
PLAINTIFF'S PARTNERSHIP CLAIM IS BARRED BY THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The Ghaffarians alleged in their Answer to the Complaint that Mardanlou's claim
for breach of the alleged oral partnership agreement is barred by the four-year statute of
limitations set forth in Utah Code. Ann. § 78-12-25(1). (R-22). The Ghaffarians also
argued that defense at trial. (R-1291 at pp. 508:12-510:10). Mardanlou ignored that
argument and the district court made no findings regarding the statute of limitations
defense.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 provides that an action "not founded upon an
instrument in writing" may be brought within four years. The district court found that the
Ghaffarians breached an alleged oral partnership between "plaintiff and Ali Ghaffarian."
(Conclusions of Law at ]f 1; R-1221). "A statute of limitations begins to run upon the
happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action." Russell Packard
Development v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, Tf 20 (2005). Once a statute has begun to run, a
plaintiff must file his or her claim before the limitations period expires or the claim will
be barred. (Id.) Mere ignorance of the existence of a cause of action will neither prevent
the running of the statute of limitations nor excuse a plaintiffs failure to file a claim
within the relevant statutory period. (Id.)
Here, Mardanlou's claim is based on the theory that he became a partner in Access
Auto no later than November 5, 1991, when he executed the real property lease with Mr.
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Ghaffarian. (See, Plaintiffs Trial Exh.l; R-1290 at p. 38:6-16). As a partner in Access
Auto, Mr. Mardanlou would have been entitled to (1) an equal share of the profits, and (2)
a "mutual right of control" in the affairs of the partnership. Bassett v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1,
2 (Utah 1974). Yet, Mr. Mardanlou admitted at trial that he was denied these rights from
the very beginning of his relationship with Mr. Ghaffarian in 1991. Mr. Mardanlou
testified that because his wife worked for the IRS, it was important for him to file
accurate and timely tax returns. In April 1992 he claims to have asked Mr. Ghaffarian to
cooperate with him in the filing of a "partnership tax return" and Mr. Ghaffarian rejected
that request. (R-1290 at 113:16-25). Mardanlou claimed that every year thereafter until
1997 he asked Mr. Ghaffarian to file partnership returns and Mr. Ghaffarian "again
refused to file any partnership returns." (R-1290 at pp. 117:12-118:17). When asked why
he "didn't just break up the partnership" after Mr. Ghaffarian refused his repeated
requests to file partnership returns, Mr. Mardanlou testified "basically, I took Ali's word
for it that we are partners." (R-1290 at p. 118:4-12). While it strains credulity to suggest
that Mr. Mardanlou knowingly risked the loss of his wife's job and criminal tax liability
in reliance on Mr. Ghaffarian's alleged assurances that he would provide the partnership
information later, his failure to file a claim for more than six years after his partner
refused to provide him with critical tax information mandates dismissal of that claim
under the applicable four year statute of limitations, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(1).

33

The partnership that was allegedly formed in November 1991 was also breached in
numerous other ways that Mr. Mardanlou became aware of more than four years before
this claim was filed in November 1998. As a party to the lease/option agreement, Mr.
Mardanlou is deemed to have constructive knowledge of its terms, including the
November 5, 1993 expiration date.3 See, e.g., Theros v. Metropolitan Life Ins., 17 Utah
2d 205, 407 P.2d 685, 688 (Utah 1965). That knowledge, combined with the fact that
Access Auto continued to occupy the premises after the option expired without Mr.
Mardanlou having participated in the option exercise, is more than sufficient to put Mr.
Mardanlou on notice that the oral partnership agreement he allegedly entered into with
Mr. Ghaffarian was breached. Accordingly, the four-year statute of limitations began to
run no later than November 5, 1993. The filing of the Complaint on November 6, 1998
was thus untimely.
Mr. Mardanlou also testified that from the very beginning of his business
relationship with Mr. Ghaffarian in November 1991, he was denied access to the Access

3

The lease was executed on November 5, 1991 with an option to renew for an
additional term and an option to purchase at the "end of the term". (Plaintiffs Trial Exh.
1). Plaintiff originally stated he acquired actual knowledge that Mr. Ghaffarian
purchased the property without his permission "approximately 6 months" after Mr.
Ghaffarian exercised the option in November 1993. (R-132). At trial he testified that he
did not "discover" Mr. Ghaffarian's exercise of the option until "late 1994, early 1995."
(R-1290 at p. 64:2-5). Mr. Mardanlou's actual knowledge of the exercise is not relevant,
however, because the four-year statute of limitations applicable to this action "begins to
run upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action."
Russell 2005 UT at ^ 20. That occurred when Mr. Ghaffarian exercised the option in
November 1993 without Mr. Mardanlou's "permission".
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Auto bank account statements, check ledger and company mail box. (R-1290 at pp.
107:18-108:11). Similarly, as a partner with Mr. Ghaffarian, Mardanlou would have been
entitled to share equally in the profits of Access Auto yet he admitted that he never
"participated] in deciding what Ali's payroll or take from the company was." (R-1290 at
pp. 142:20-143:3). All of these actions violate the oral partnership agreement that was
supposedly formed in November 1991. Mr. Mardanlou's admission that he was denied
these fundamental partnership rights from the very outset of his alleged "partnership"
with Mr. Ghaffarian in November 1991, mandates the conclusion that the four-year
statute of limitations period for breach of oral agreements expired years before Mr.
Mardanlou filed his claim in November 1998.
Although the plaintiff did not address the statute of limitations argument at trial, he
may try to argue on appeal that the statute should be "equitably tolled" if he did not
"become aware of the cause of action because of defendant's concealment or misleading
conduct." (Russell Packard, 2005 UT 14, Tf 25). However, application of the "discovery
rule" to toll the running of the statute of limitations "requires a demonstration that the
party seeking to exercise the rule has acted in a reasonable and diligent manner" (Id. at ^f
26), this Court should rule as a matter of law that plaintiffs claim is barred by the fouryear statute of limitations based on Mr. Mardanlou's admissions that he was denied basic
partnership rights from the beginning of his alleged partnership agreement with Mr.
Ghaffarian in November 1991 and did not file this claim until November 1998. The
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evidence in the record is more than sufficient for this Court to rule as a matter of law that
Mr. Mardanlou "reasonably [should] have discovered the facts underlying a cause of
action" more than four years before he filed his claim in November 1998.
III.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING POST
DISSOLUTION RENTAL DAMAGES
The district court found that the "only evidence" of damages offered by the
plaintiff is an appraisal of the Property for $850,000, excluding mortgages. (R-1292 at p.
496:18-25). The Court awarded the plaintiff a one-half interest in that Property (subject
to existing mortgages and minus the expenses paid and the value of post dissolution
expenses and improvements made by the Ghaffarians), plus one-half the Courtdetermined $83,500 annual rental value of the Property . . . plus simple interest at the rate
of 10% per annum from the first day of each month" until the date judgment was entered.
(R-1221).
The plaintiff first requested rental damages (for the period following his departure
from Access Auto in November 1997) in his post-trial brief in opposition to Defendant's
Motion for a Limited New Trial. (R-1009). The district court construed that request as
an "election" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-39 "to receive his portion of the profits
from the partnership property from the time of dissolution in lieu of interest from the time
of dissolution." (R-1094). Section 48-1-39 provides:
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When any partner retires or dies and the business is continued . . .
without any settlement of accounts as between him or his estate and the
person or partnership continuing the business unless otherwise agreed,
he or his legal representatives as against such persons or partnership may
have the value of his interest at the date of dissolution ascertained, and
shall receive as an ordinary creditor an amount equal to the value of his
interest in the dissolved partnership with interest, or, at his option . . . in
lieu of interest, the profits attributable to the use of his right in the
property of the dissolved partnership. (Emphasis added).
The award of post dissolution rent is contrary to the express language of Section
48-1-39 which limits recovery to either (1) "interest" on the value of the dissolved
partnership or (2) "in lieu of interest... the profits attributable to the use of [the common
partner's] right in the property of the dissolved partnership."4 Here, no interest was
awarded because the district court did not award monetary damages based on the value of
the property. Instead, the court ordered the Ghaffarians to transfer a one-half interest in
the property to Mr. Mardanlou. Nor is Mardanlou entitled to the alternative remedy of
"the profits attributable to the use of his right in the property," because he failed to offer
any evidence of profits. See e^g., Parker v. Northern Mixing Co., 756 P.2d 881, fn. 24
(Alaska 1988) (reversing an award of rental value damages on the ground that partner in
possession of partnership property was not required to pay other partner rental value as
damages). The district court erred by awarding post dissolution rental value and
prejudgment interest on that amount.

4

Defendant preserved this argument for appeal at R-l 113, 1115-17.
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The amount of the rent awarded to plaintiff for the five and a half year period
November 1997 through March 2003 was also not supported by any competent evidence.
The court found that the "reasonable annual rental value of for the property" for that
period is $83,500. (R-1085). That figure was taken out of plaintiff s property appraisal
for a different time period, 1992 through November 1997 (Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 8, at p.
103), and from an appraisal that the court had indicated was "immaterial" since the court
had decided to award half the Property instead of half of an appraised value of the
Property. (R-1293 at p. 23:1-4). That rent amount was also grossly overstated for the
many reasons explained by defendants' expert (R-813-814; R-1293 at pp. 100-110;
Defendants' Exh. 7 at April 3, 2003 evidentiary hearing), which were all unrefutted by
plaintiff.
The district court also erred in awarding pre-judgment interest on the rent award.
Pre-judgment interest is inappropriate to unfixed amounts such as fair rental value. Only
damages that are "fixed as of a particular time" and that can be "calculated with
mathematical accuracy, " and that can be "measured by facts and figures" are subject to
pre-judgment interest. Biork v. April Indus., Inc. 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977). "In
particular, damages ascertained by determining the fair market value of real property
../cannot be determined with mathematical precision, [and] may be inherently uncertain'"
and are thus "far too uncertain to support a prejudgment interest award." Price-Orem v.
Rollins. Brown & Gunnell 784 P.2d 475, 483 (Utah App. 1989).
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CONCLUSION
The district court's judgment in favor of plaintiff Mardanlou should be reversed
because the undisputed facts prove that the parties never agreed to share profits or control
in Access Auto. That judgment should also be reversed on the ground that the plaintiffs
claims are barred by the statute of limitations. The district court also erred by awarding
rental value damages to plaintiff and with prejudgment interest. Accordingly, the
defendants respectfully request that the district court's decision be reversed and judgment
entered in their favor.
Respectfully submitted this _|_ day of April, 2005.
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH

JAMES D. GILSON
MARK L. CALLISTER
Gateway Tower East, Suite 900
10 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Attorneys for Appellants
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CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH, Gateway Tower East, Suite 900, 10 East
South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84133, and that two (2) true and correct copies of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS were caused to be served upon the following by
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prepaid thereon, this J _ day of April, 2005.
J. Kent Holland
623 East 100 South
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

HASSAN MARDANLOU,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO.

VS.

980911308

ALI GHAFFARIAN, individually,
NASRIN FAEZI, individually,
ALI GHAFFARIAN and NASRIN FAEZI,
dba ACCESS AUTO,
Defendants•

The above-entitled matter came before the Honorable L.A. Dever
for trial. After hearing testimony from witnesses for both sides
and argument of counsel, the Court made the following Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The lease/purchase agreement establishes that plaintiff

and defendant Ali Ghaffarian entered into this agreement with
lessor/seller Cline's Investments as either a partnership agreement
or joint venture.
2.

The

insurance document

contains both plaintiff

and

defendant Ali Ghaffarian as insureds under the policy inferring a
partnership.
3.

The insurance agent believed that the plaintiff and

defendant Ali Ghaffarian were partners.

MARDANLOU V. GHAFFARIAN
4.
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The Access Auto business card contains both names equally

on the card.
5.

Defendant Ali Ghaffarian represented to his friend,

Hashem Farr, that plaintiff and he were partners.
6.
confronted

Hashem Farr was present when defendant Ali Ghaffarian was
by plaintiff regarding that the Access Auto real

property was purchased only in defendant Ali Ghaffarian's name and
Hashem Farr heard defendant Ali Ghaffarian state to plaintiff,
"Don't worry, we're partners."
7.

There was a division of labor between plaintiff and

defendant Ali Ghaffarian.
8.

Plaintiff purchased the furniture used in the business of

Access Auto, indicating he viewed Access Auto, the business, as a
partnership.
9*

Plaintiff purchased the business cards for the business,

indicating he viewed Access Auto, the business, as a partnership.
10.

The salaries for two of Access Auto's employees were paid

by plaintiff, indicating he viewed Access Auto, the business, as a
partnership.
11.

Defendant Ali Ghaffarian represented to plaintiff that

he was the only other member of Access Auto besides plaintiff.
12.

Defendant Ali Ghaffarian signed the doing business as

Access Auto prior to the association of plaintiff in only his name.
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Defendant Ali Ghaffarian filed the tax returns for Access

Auto only in his name.
14.

The mortgage on his property was paid for by the proceeds

from the business, Access Auto, run by plaintiff and defendant Ali
Ghaffarian.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

As

a

matter

of

law, plaintiff

and

defendant

Ali

Ghaffarian were partners.
2.

Defendants are estopped from claiming that there were

additional partners besides plaintiff and Ali Ghaffarian, due to
the representations and acts of defendant Ali Ghaffarian that he
was the sole proprietor of Access Auto, prior to the partnership
between plaintiff and defendant Ali Ghaffarian.
3.

Defendant Ali Ghaffarian would be guilty of committing

fraud by claiming his wife was a partner due to his prior actions
and representations.
4.

Defendant Ali Ghaffarian appropriated the partnership

real property by placing it solely in his name.
5.

The plaintiff has been damaged.
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The damages in this case are one-half of the real

property of Access Auto situated at 3960-3964 S. State Street,
subject to the allocation of remaining debt on the property.
Dated this

\ day of February, 2003.

L. A.\j5j&fef*^
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing

Findings

following, this ^)

of

Fact and

Conclusions

day of February, 2003:

J. Kent Holland
Attorney for Plaintiff
623 East 100 South
P.O. Box 11643
Salt Lake City, Utah

84147-0643

Robert L. Booker
Attorney for Defendants
23 0 West 200 South, Suite 2410
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

:

HASSAN MARDANLOU

SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 980911308
vs.
ACCESS AUTO, et al.,
Defendant.

Following an April 3, 2003 evidentiary hearing, this Court
requested and received further briefing regarding the subject of
that hearing. The proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law
together with the memoranda requested were submitted for decision
on May 20, 2003.

The following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law are to be read in conjunction with this Court's Memorandum
Decision of even date, and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law filed in this matter on February 4, 2003.

Based upon the

evidence received at the April 3, 2003 hearing, and the arguments
of the parties, the Court finds:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

All of the proceeds from the two loans secured against

the property (the Small Business Administration Loan and the First

,AN-7*
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Security Bank Loan ("the mortgage loans") were for the purchase of
the property, which was the primary asset of the partnership.
2.

As of November 7, 1997, the principal balance owing on

the mortgage loans was $211,722.24.
3.

The outstanding principal balance on the mortgage loans

on March 30, 2003 was $26,631.01.
4.

From November 7, 1997 through March 2 003, Defendants

have made $237,464.09 in principal and interest payments on the
mortgage loans.
5.
have paid

From November 7, 1997 through April 3, 2 003 Defendants
$26,977.23

in property

taxes

on

the

property,

and

$3,03 6.46 to insure the property.
6.

Between November 7, 1997 and March 2 003, Defendants

made improvements to lots 18 and 19 valuing $162,300.00. The Court
finds that $12,124.00 of the canal work should be attributed to the
Marathon property, noted at lot 19 on defendant's exhibit, thereby
reducing the value of improvements to the subject property to
$150,176.00.
7.

The total amount advanced by defendants in either cash

or value added
$417,653.78.
8.

since November

7, 1997 through March

2003 is

One half of this amount is $208,826.89.

A reasonable amount of interest accruing on the amounts

expended by defendants is 8%, calculated simply from the date of
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The

interest

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

only applies

to % of

the amounts

expended by the defendants
9.
$83,500.

The reasonable annual rental value for the property is
One half the reasonable rental value of the property for

5M years is $229,625.

The plaintiff

is also entitled to 8%

interest on his M share of the rent from the first day of each
month during the 5M year period.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Defendants are entitled to receive as an offset to

plaintifffs award of one-half interest in the partnership property,
one-half

of

all mortgage payments, one-half

of

the

insurance

payments, one-half of the property tax payments from November 7,
1997 to the present.
2.

Defendants are entitled to receive as an additional

offset to plaintifffs award of one-half interest in the property,
one-half of the value of the improvements made to the property from
November 7, 1997 to the present.
3.
accruing

Defendants are entitled to receive interest at 8%,
simply

improvement,

on

from
the

the
amounts

date

of

the

identified

expenditure
above.

or

Plaintiff

the
is

entitled to receive interest at 8%, accruing simply each month on
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the rental value due, as identified above.
4.

Defendants remain entitled to one-half of the amounts

expended from April 3, 2003, through the date of amended judgment,
which shall include a calculation of the interest accruing simply
at 8% from the time of the expenditure or the improvement through
•the date of Judgment.
5.

Plaintiff remains entitled to one-half the rental value

of the property from May 7, 2003, forward, plus interest accruing
simply at 8% from the first day of each month until paid.
Attorney

for Defendant

is hereby

requested

to prepare a

judgment consistent with these findings of fact and conclusions of
law.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of
the Court's Memorandum Decision and Order, as well as the Court's
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to be sent
by United States Mail, on the 2Q^

day of July, 2003, to the

following:
J. Kent Holland
623 E a s t 1 s t S o u t h
P . O . Box 11643
Salt Lake City, UT 84147

James D. Gilson
10 East South Temple, Ste 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84133
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

HASSAN MARDANLOU,

:

ORDER

:

CASE NO, 980911308

Plaintiff,
vs.

:

ALI GHAFFARIAN, individually,
:
NASRIN FAEZI, individually,
ALI GHAFFARIAN and NASRIN FAEZI, :
dba ACCESS AUTO,
:

Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on February 25, 2004, on
defendants' Objections

to the Court's Memorandum Decision and

Findings which were issued July 22, 2003.
The Court has considered the Objections of the defendants and
rules as follows;.
1-

The

amount

of

taxes

paid

was

$42,389.69

and

not

$26,977.23 as previously determined by the Court. Defendants are
entitled to an offset of one-half of the actual taxes paid.
2.

The

Court

based

its

decision

improvements on the testimony at trial.

on

the

value

of

the

The testimony was clear

that the Marathon property, not owned by the plaintiff, received a
benefit from the improvements.

The amount determined to be a

benefit to the Marathon property was deducted from the claim of the
defendants and will not be revisited by the Court.

* i n—i
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The interest rate used by the Court was that suggested by

the defendants' expert. The Court will revise the interest rate to
comply with the statute: 10% prejudgment and 3.38% post-judgment.
4,

The Court's decision in awarding pre-post Judgment to

plaintiff and against defendants is reaffirmed.
Counsel for the plaintiff is to draft the final Judgment in
compliance with this Order.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Order, to the following, this /sU

J. Kent Holland
Attorney for Plaintiff
623 East 100 South
P.O. Box 11643
Salt Lake City, Utah
84147
James D. Gilson
Attorney for Defendants
10 E. South Temple, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133

day of April, 2004:

_

1 ISs~

, TOST COliT

<A t c «

l
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James D. Gilson (5472)
SALT U i E CUJWTY
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH
«y—
( ^
Deputy Clerk
10 East South Temple, Suite 900
».*,*/» ^
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
' ^ A G F D
LJ
Telephone: (801)530-7300
Facsimile: (801) 364-9127
ENTERED IN REGISTRY

OF JUDGMENTS
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
HASSAN MARDANLOU,
AMENDED JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 980911308
vs.
Honorable L.A. Dever
ALIGHAFFARIAN, individually; NASRIN
FAEZI-GHAFFARIAN; ALI GHAFFARIAN
and NASRIN FAEZI-GHAFFARIAN, dba
ACCESS AUTO,
Defendants.

The above-entitled matter came before the Honorable L.A. Dever for trial on October 16,
17, and 18,2002. On October 18, 2002, the court announced its findings and conclusions from
the bench. Written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and a non-final Judgment was
entered by the Court on February 4, 2003. An evidentiary hearing was held by the Court on April
3,2003 pursuant to defendants' Motion for Limited New Trial. After hearing the evidence at
that hearing, and having reviewed the post-hearing memoranda by the parties, on July 22,2003
the Court issued Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Memorandum

980911308

JD16342014
GHAFFARIAN,ALI

I'V^S I

Decision and Order, after which the Defendants filed a Motion to Amend and Objections on
August 13,2003. A hearing on the Defendants' Motion and Objections was held on February 25,
2004, which Motion the court granted in part and denied in part by its Order dated April 20,
2004. Pursuant thereto, the Court's February 4,2003 Judgment is hereby amended to state as
follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that Defendants shall
transfer by deed to the Plaintiff Hassan Mardanlou an undivided one-half interest in the real
property known as Access Auto, situated at 3960-3964 S. State Street in Salt Lake County (the
"Property"). Such interest shall be subject to an equitable lien in favor of Defendants, securing
the obligation of Plaintiff to pay Defendants one-half the $663,414.90 amount that Defendants
advanced towards the Property (for mortgage payments, insurance, property taxes,
improvements, and interest on such advances at 10% per annum) from November 7,1997
through June 14,2004, plus simple interest on that amount at the rate of 10% per annum from
June 14,2004 until the date hereof, and thereafter at the rate of 3.29% (Utah Code Ann. § 15-14(3)(a)), until paid. Plaintiffs one-half interest in the Property is also subject to the existing
mortgage lien arising from the outstanding SBA loan for the Property.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that Defendants' interest
in the Property is subject to an equitable lien in favor of the plaintiff, securing the obligation of
Defendants to pay Plaintiff one-half the court-determined $83,500 annual rental value of the
Property, pro-rated each month for the period November 7,1997 until the date hereof, plus
simple interest at the rate of 10% per annum from the first day of each month during this period,
and thereafter at the rate of 3.29% (Utah Code Ann. § 15-l-4(3)(a)), until paid.
2

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any and all remaining claims in this action are
dismissed with
mi prejudice.
picjuuiuc.

D a t e d ^ ^ ^ W l H VI,2004.
'Sfw^

DISTMCT C^URT JUDG^L

Approved as to form:

J. Kent Holland
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH

Juries D. Gilson

'
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true copy of the foregoing [proposed] AMENDED
JUDGMENT to be mailed on July /&_, 2004 to the following:
J. Kent Holland
ANDERSON & HOLLAND
623 East First South
P.O. Box 11643
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
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